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I. INTRODUCTION
In its entirety, the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1
Congress passed the Fourth Amendment (“the Amendment”) on September
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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25, 1789, and it was subsequently ratified on December 15, 1791.2 When it
was written over two hundred years ago, the writers intended for the
Amendment to provide exactly what it said— protection for citizens from
unlawful searches and seizures absent a warrant or probable cause.3 At the
time the Fourth Amendment became part of the Constitution, it was only
intended to be applied to the federal government; later, however, the
Amendment became applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment can be split into two
ideologies: original intent and original meaning.5 Proponents of the first
ideology would look at the constitutional framer’s understanding when they
wrote the Amendment.6 In other words, advocates of original intent see the
Amendment as covering exactly what the framers wrote at the time;
therefore, the Fourth Amendment would not cover devices—such as cell
phones—that did not exist in the eighteenth century.7 On the contrary,
proponents of original meaning ask what a reasonable person would interpret
the meaning of the Amendment to be at the time of its ratification.8
Proponents of this theory look at the Amendment as ever-changing to
provide protections consistent with the needs of the era—meaning that the
connotation of the Amendment from the time of ratification (a guarantee
from unreasonable searches and seizures) remains exactly the same,
however, the definition of those domains protected by the Amendment
(persons, houses, papers, and effects) are apt for a change of interpretation.9
Whether a search is reasonable in the eyes of the law is determined by
balancing two interests: (1) intrusion on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
individual; and (2) legitimate government interests such as public safety.10
In recognizing this, American jurisprudence has created exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that respect these two interests.11

2

Id.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (“The well-known historical
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance,
was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers
and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
4
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
5
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 250 (2009).
6
Id. at 248.
7
See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 5, at 248.
8
Colby, supra note 5, at 250.
9
See id. at 250–53.
10
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
11
See id. An example of this would be a vehicle search by an officer during a traffic
stop—but only with probable cause.
3
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Applying the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to today’s digital age
from an original intent standpoint presents many challenges; application of
this ideology suggests that one’s electronic devices are not shielded from
unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant or probable cause.12
Modern interpretation of the Fourth Amendment leads to a peculiar issue—
what is covered by the Fourth Amendment in the modern era? For the
purposes of this paper, an original meaning stance will be taken to explore
the issue of whether or not the Fourth Amendment has effectively adjusted
to the digital age. A cell phone search can reveal as much about an individual
as the search of a home, yet some courts have deemed warrantless cell phone
searches constitutional.13 Thus, if a search of a cell phone is as invasive as
that of a home, it stands to reason the same guidelines should apply when
determining what constitutional protections are applicable. Furthermore, an
individual’s digital trail can be stitched together to paint a picture of his or
her private life.14 The protections afforded to one’s “papers and effects” are
a matter of privacy and if digital trails assist in taking away privacy, then
they should be afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment.
In an age where much of an individual’s life is centered around
electronic devices, what is protected from unreasonable search and seizure
by the Fourth Amendment? In other words, what constitutes “papers and
effects”? The definition of “papers and effects” depends on an interpretation
of what one can reasonably expect to be private.15 Do internet searches, cell
phones, data stored in the “cloud,” emails, and all other aspects of one’s
digital footprint fall under the blanket of protection the Constitution’s
framers meant for citizens when writing the Fourth Amendment? Under
current law, these activities are given very little privacy protection,
undermining constitutional safeguards that are essential to individual
liberties and a robust democracy.16 This creates a privacy gap by denying
Fourth Amendment protection to data processed by third parties, including
data stored in the “cloud.”17

12

See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 5, at 250.
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014) (“[A] cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A
phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home;
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—
unless the phone is.”); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
14
See Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97.
15
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16
Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the ThirdParty Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 247 (2016).
17
Id.
13
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The issue at hand is whether the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test attributed to the Fourth Amendment adequately protects privacy interests
in today’s digital age. As time progresses and technology advances, the
privacy gap has widened and no measures have been taken to fill the void.
The laws governing online privacy are older than the internet and the laws
in place protecting electronic communications are an inconsistent and
illogical patchwork.18 In the digital age, the standard “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test attributed to the Fourth Amendment is outdated.
The present test does not adequately protect digital communications and a
different test is needed for digital communications, which the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) should be updated to
include.19
This comment argues for the need for a distinct test for digital privacy
protections accounting for the changes brought on by modern technology,
which the ECPA should be amended to include. Part II of this comment
delves into the origins of digital privacy protections. Part III critiques
protections in place today, dissecting the fatal flaw in applying outdated
mechanisms. This section also analyzes what makes digital content different
and how digital privacy rights can be secured through amendment of the
ECPA. Finally, part IV concludes that technological developments have put
a tremendous amount of stress on the antiquated Fourth Amendment privacy
protections of today and that a new framework for digital content should be
implemented through the ECPA.
II. A LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF DIGITAL PRIVACY
A. Katz v. United States
The springboard for digital privacy came in 1967 with Katz v. United
States.20 Here, the petitioner, Katz, had been convicted of transmitting
gambling information over the telephone.21 To acquire the information that
led to Katz’s conviction, the federal agents investigating him attached an
eavesdropping device outside the public phone booth used by Katz; at trial,
the recordings of Katz’s conversations were entered into evidence to be used
against him.22 The question presented in this case became whether the
Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable searches and seizures” protection
required police to obtain a search warrant before wiretapping a public
18
19

Id.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23

(2018).
20
21
22

See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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payphone.23 The Court ruled that the government’s use of an electronic
device to record conversations inside a telephone booth without a warrant
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.24 Katz declared that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places”; this was a dramatic shift in
reasoning from previous rulings of the Court, which had been dominated by
the concepts of property and trespass.25 Although Katz had been having a
conversation in a public telephone booth, he sought to preserve the
conversation as private—as demonstrated by his shutting of the booth door
behind him; the government’s eavesdropping violated the privacy “upon
which he justifiably relied.”26
Out of this case came the “reasonable expectation of privacy” formula,
commonly referred to as the Katz test.27 The test is based on the concurrence
of Justice John Harlan in the case, in which he stated, “[m]y understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”28
This test has become the balancing test of Fourth Amendment
protection in many cases, particularly those involving electronic
surveillance.29 Theoretically, this rule is reasonable because it would appear
on the surface to help adapt Fourth Amendment protections to the evolving
digital age. However, the discretion is all in the hands of judges to determine
if an individual truly expected privacy in a given situation, and then to decide
whether society is prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable.30 New
York University Law professor, Anthony Amsterdam, discusses the
inquiries into the reasonable expectation test, calling them “needless,”
maintaining that the inquiry into what society expects to be private “destroys
the spirit of Katz and most of Katz’s substance.”31 Amsterdam goes on to
note the government could quite easily weaken our expectations of privacy
by “announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”32 Amsterdam
further expounds upon the idea that the government can effortlessly
23

Id. at 349–50.
Id. at 359.
25
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
26
Id. at 353.
27
Price, supra note 16, at 249.
28
Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Price, supra note 16, at 261.
29
Price, supra note 16, at 262.
30
Id.
31
Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
383 (1974).
32
Id. at 384.
24
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overcome privacy expectations, noting that expectations are shaped by what
practices the law allows—making the Katz test somewhat circular.33
While the test may have been workable enough in the era of its
conception, applying the test to the modern era has weakened privacy
interests.34 This issue will only worsen as time goes on if the test continues
to be used in the digital era.35 Courts are unable to balance privacy interests
against those of law enforcement, and as technology continues to advance,
areas in which a person can reasonably expect privacy will decrease until
this expectation becomes virtually non-existent.36
B. “Reasonable” Expectations of Privacy
The core policy concerns underlying the Fourth Amendment are the
individual privacy expectations that individuals must possess for society to
be free and functional.37 The problem with this statement, however, is it has
not been made clear how this societal expectation should be measured. One
measurement for gauging reasonable privacy expectations is by “assessing
the frequency of public traffic in an area”—in other words, if an activity is
occurring in a public area with a high chance of discovery or observation,
society should not accept a claim to privacy as valid or reasonable.38
In looking at privacy expectations in the modern era, one can look to
the relatively recent case of United States v. Jones.39 In Jones, the Court
stepped away from the Katz standard and headed down a different privacy
path. This case dealt with a respondent who was under suspicion of narcotics
trafficking.40 Authorities were granted a warrant authorizing them to put a
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on the underside of
Jones’ vehicle; they did so, however, after the deadline stated on the
warrant.41 Using the GPS device they had unconstitutionally installed, the
officers tracked the vehicle’s movements and eventually obtained an
indictment against the accused, which included charges of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine.42 The question posited in Jones was whether the
33

Price, supra note 16, at 262.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Brandon T. Crowther, (Un)Reasonable Expectation of Digital Privacy, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 343, 344 (2012).
37
Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like
Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment,
24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 187 (2012).
38
Id. at 188.
39
See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
40
Id. at 402.
41
Id. at 400.
42
Id. at 403.
34
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attachment of the GPS device to the respondent’s vehicle and its use to
monitor the movements of the vehicle constituted a “search and seizure” as
it pertains to the Fourth Amendment.43
The ruling passed down in Jones stated, unanimously, that the
installation of a GPS tracking device underneath Jones’ car qualified as a
search under the Fourth Amendment.44 It might be presumed that the Court
came to this conclusion through the application of the Katz test45; however,
in this instance the Court switched gears, instead applying a trespass doctrine
from the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States.46 Due to what the Court called
a “physical intrusion”—the means by which the officers accessed the vehicle
to attach the device47—the Court chose to abandon Katz in this instance.48
Because of the nation’s incessant reliance on technology as a form of
communication, a reasonable theory is that Scalia felt society’s expectation
of privacy was eroding.49 With today’s heavy reliance on social media as a
form of interaction, the lines of what privacy rights citizens consider
“reasonable” become blurred. Katz cannot provide the Fourth Amendment
protection it was intended any longer.
C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Because many forms of communication were not properly protected,
Congress implemented the ECPA in 1986 in an effort to keep up with new
technologies.50 The ECPA governs prohibitions on the interception of
electronic communications.51 The ECPA prohibitions relate to “any wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photo-electronic facilities for the
transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer
facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications.”52 Katz stands for the idea that no Fourth Amendment
protection exists without a reasonable expectation of privacy.53 If there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, then there is no violation of a Fourth

43
44
45

cases.

Id. at 402.
Id. at 404.
Because Katz was the usual test for Fourth Amendment protection in these types of

46
Brian M. Kistner, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital World: Do You Have an
Expectation of Privacy on the Internet?, Seton Hall Law School Student Scholarship 1, 10
(2016); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
47
The officers encroached on private property to access the vehicle.
48
Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
49
Kistner, supra note 46, at 11.
50
1-2 Law of The Internet § 2.03(4)(a) (2017).
51
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23.
52
18 U.S.C. § 2510(14).
53
See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
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Amendment right for a claim based on the ECPA.54 While the ECPA granted
protection to previously unprotected forms of electronic communication, the
legislation still leaves something to be desired.
When the ECPA was enacted, its creators did not foresee the
technological society we live in today. Its provisions were meant to deal
with government intrusions by technology of the time, which has grown to
be worlds apart from that which exists today.55 The immense amount of data
that technology is capable of collecting creates far greater implications for
Fourth Amendment protections than the ECPA writers could have possibly
imagined.56 Present protections fall flat—data is and should be recognized
as fundamentally distinct. As the ECPA exists today, courts are left to
attempt to apply provisions meant for traditional surveillance methods to
digital searches.
D. Another Layer: Mosaic Theory
United States v. Maynard, decided in 2010, held the government’s
warrantless surveillance of a defendant via a GPS device mounted on his car
for over a month violated the Constitution’s protection against warrantless
searches.57 The striking similarity to the Jones case is to be noted; the court
in Maynard stepped away from the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the
time—just like in the Jones ruling.58 To reach their ruling, however, the
Maynard court used what is known as the mosaic theory and adapted it to
the context of the Fourth Amendment.59 Under this “mosaic theory of
privacy,” while individual actions of law enforcement may not be considered
searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, when taken together they may be
considered searches.60 Prior to Jones, decisions regarding the Fourth
Amendment had always broken down each part of an investigation
individually.61 GPS surveillance decisions could indicate the Court is ready
to embrace a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection.
54

1-2 Law of The Internet § 2.03(2) (2017).
See Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones
Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 349, 360.
56
See id.
57
See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
58
Compare id. at 559–61 (surveying recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), with
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (noting the Court’s shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after
1967).
59
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard,
the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 738
(2011).
60
Dennis, supra note 59, at 738.
61
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
312 (2012).
55
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What sets the mosaic theory apart from traditional Fourth Amendment
search doctrine is that it looks at government conduct as a whole rather than
as individual steps.62 The mosaic theory looks at whether non-searches,
when analyzed in the aggregate, are so revealing they amount to a search.63
III: CRITICISMS OF TODAY’S DIGITAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
A. Criticism of Katz
The standard “reasonable expectation of privacy” test attributed to
Fourth Amendment searches dates back to Justice John Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz v. United States.64 The binary requirement of the test is that “a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”65 The requirements set forth make sense logically, but each is
not without its own issues when applied to the modern digital context.
The first prong of Katz requires that there be a subjective interest of
privacy to establish a legitimate privacy interest.66 The policy rationale
behind this is that there is no reason why a right of privacy should be granted
to an individual who does not have an actual expectation of privacy.67 The
problem with this rationale is that it is difficult to determine whether an
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has
not been able to provide much guidance on this standard because it is
unavoidably fact intensive. The only insight the Court has provided is that
an individual must outwardly show in some way that he seeks to preserve
something as private, essentially applying an objective measurement to this
subjective prong.68 For an individual to have an expectation of privacy, the
external evidence must show he sought to protect something as private
through his conduct.69 On the other hand, searches involving any sort of
tangible object generally question whether the object is physically locked.70
In a majority of cases, the subjective prong becomes inapt because it adds
little to analysis.71 As expectation of privacy is a subjective concept, it is
difficult to ascertain whether it exists or not. Adding to this difficulty is the
62

Id. at 320.
Id.
64
Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Crowther, supra note 36, at 346.
68
Id.
69
Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80
MISS. L.J. 1033, 1057 (2011).
70
Crowther, supra note 36, at 346.
71
Id. at 346–47.
63
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fact that often times even if a person were to have a subjective expectation
of privacy, society would not recognize it as reasonable.72 The legitimacy of
the subjective prong relies upon accurately determining one’s mental state to
judge whether he actually expects privacy, which is exceedingly difficult.73
The second prong of Katz relies upon society’s objective expectations.74
Much like judging one’s subjective expectation of privacy, deducing what
privacy expectations society is willing to accept as reasonable is an arduous
task. The Supreme Court fails to articulate a clear objective standard to
measure society’s expectations, saying only that judges should look at
“widely shared societal expectations” and giving no guidance as to how one
should go about determining that shared expectation.75
This prong of Katz has become an exceedingly flexible one—ultimately
leaving what “society” is willing to recognize as reasonable up to one
person—a judge. This leads to inconsistent applications of the standard,
which impedes the fundamental privacy interest. These contentions are not
without merit—even the Supreme Court has voiced its concern over Katz as
a proper measure of Fourth Amendment coverage.76 In the 2010 case of City
of Ontario v. Quon, the Court’s confidence in Katz was put to the test.77 The
issue in Quon involved a police department supervisor’s searching of an
officer’s private messages on an electronic mobile device that had been
issued to the officer for use in his work.78 This search was not for nefarious
purposes, but rather, because Mr. Quon had repeatedly gone over his
message limit and the supervisor sought to determine whether the overage
was for personal or work-related messages.79 The city of Ontario reserved
the right through its “Computer Usage, Internet, and E-Mail Policy” to audit
the messages, however, they contended they would not do so if the employee
paid for overage—which Quon had done.80 The officer brought a Fourth
Amendment claim against the city; applying Katz to the issue at hand, the
Court was to evaluate society’s privacy expectations of text messages sent
and received on an employer’s electronic mobile device.81 The justices in
the case took issue with applying Katz to the case in assessing the privacy
interest; they did not see a correlation between the privacy interest in a
72
73
74
75

Id. at 347.
Id.
Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Crowther, supra note 36, at 348; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 129

(2006).
76
77
78
79
80
81

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 751–52.
Quon, 560 U.S. at 750.
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telephone booth and that of texting at the office, as the two are worlds apart.82
In the end, the Court decided that even if this surveillance constituted a
search, it was reasonable—therefore, the City of Ontario did not violate Mr.
Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights.83 Applied to the modern era, it has
become evident that the Katz test has faced a plethora of issues with regard
to its application to digital content.84
B. What makes digital content different?
It has become remarkably difficult to mechanically apply the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test because digital content inherently
differs on many levels from that which Katz was originally applied to.85
Digital content pervades virtually every facet of American life, creating a
mass amount of digital information which only continues to grow larger.86 It
differs from physical data in its quantity, quality, and permanence, among
other things. Information which was previously physical is now being
converted to digital form, and computer technology has made it so the
number of files, images, and documents one can create in the digital sphere
is seemingly endless.87 Adding to this is the fact that computers often record
information unbeknownst to the user—an individual’s internet history is
recorded on his hard drive, constructing a trail of what has been done on that
computer.88 Additionally, the permanence of evolving digital technology has
changed the meaning of “privacy.” As so much information and history are
conserved online, it can be easily accessed and collected by the government
in mass quantities.
Perhaps the most drastic way that digital data differs from physical data
is the quantity of information that can be obtained digitally. A physical
search of a home, for example, will only turn up so much digital information
due to its capacity. Conversely, a computer has a seemingly endless
capacity, with the ability to hold up to terabytes of data.89 A digital search,
therefore, is intrinsically different than a physical search because it gives
access to massive amounts of information which could not possibly be
obtained through a physical search.
82

Id. at 761.
Id. at 765.
84
See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. 746.
85
See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347. The test, when used in Katz, involved the use of a
listening device on the outside of a telephone booth and whether the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment right to privacy had been violated.
86
Scott D. Blake, Let’s Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital
Age, 5 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 491, 499 (2010).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010 (last accessed April 2, 2020).
83
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With digital data differing in quantity, quality, and permanence from
the traditional physical data that the courts have been accustomed to dealing
with, the question then becomes how digital data should be treated with
respect to the Fourth Amendment. In this sense, the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test must be revaluated with respect to digital
searches, as digital data should be protected just as efficiently as tangible
objects.
The technological developments of today have placed a tremendous
amount of stress on the frameworks for Fourth Amendment privacy
protections. These protections developed in an era when electronics did not
exist or otherwise were not prevalent, and the Supreme Court has been
unsuccessful in keeping up with the application of the Fourth Amendment
with today’s technology.
C. Mosaic Theory Issues
The mosaic theory presents a new challenge to settled law.90 The
mosaic theory is premised on aggregation and takes re-evaluation of settled
law in a substantially different direction.91 In light of new surveillance
technologies, such as real-time GPS surveillance, the United States Court for
the District of Columbia took what was then a conceptually new approach to
Fourth Amendment law in the case of United States v. Maynard.92 This new
“mosaic theory” approach sought to foster a constitutionally anchored
“sphere of privacy” which would come into play under situations of longterm, technology driven investigations.93 This set the approach apart from
the mechanically applied Katz test in the sense that it generally provides a
greater affordance of privacy to the monitored individual.94 The premise of
the mosaic theory is that while a set of non-searches taken separately may be
considered exactly that (non-searches), if the data taken in aggregate can
create a mosaic which reveals essentially private insights about an
individual, it will trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.95
1. United States v. Maynard and United States v. Jones
To understand the mosaic theory, one must first look to the cases of
United States v. Maynard and United States v. Jones—these were separate
cases dealing with the same issue.96 In Maynard and Jones, the respondents
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Kerr, supra note 61, at 314.
Id.
Walsh, supra note 37, at 173.
Id.
Id.
See Kerr, supra note 61, at 313.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
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were under the suspicion of narcotics trafficking; following a two-year
investigation, it was discovered that the two men (Jones and Maynard) ran a
“stash house”—the contents of which included ninety-seven kilograms of
cocaine, one kilogram of crack, and $850,000 in cash.97 However, what is
of primary importance here is not the results of the investigation, but the
investigative techniques that lead to its culmination.
To begin, Jones and Maynard were put under visual surveillance.98 If
an activity is being conducted in a public area with a high chance of
discovery or observation, it is suggested that society should not accept a
claim to privacy as valid or reasonable—so, per the Katz test, this is not a
search.99
The second method used by the investigators goes a bit farther than the
aforementioned, and involved the tracking of the suspects’ cell phones.100
Here, the investigators applied for and obtained court orders which
compelled Jones’ cellular provider to release the cell tower information for
Mr. Jones’ phone.101 Cell phones function through connection to local cell
towers, which in turn route communications.102 As such, cell phone
providers keep records of which towers were used by which account.103 Most
individuals tend to carry their cell phones with them, and consequently these
cell phone records act as a tracking device.104
The third method used by authorities was to obtain a warrant
authorizing law enforcement to put a GPS tracking device on the underside
of Jones’ vehicle.105 They did so, however, one day after the deadline stated
on the warrant.106 This method is where a bulk of the Maynard and Jones
cases focused.107 Using the GPS device they had unconstitutionally installed,
the officers tracked the vehicle’s movements and eventually obtained an
indictment against the accused.108 The question posited in Maynard and
Jones was whether the attachment of the GPS device to the respondents’
vehicle and its use to monitor the movements of the vehicle constituted a
97

Maynard, 615 F.3d at 548, 567; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
Id. at 549.
99
Walsh, supra note 37, at 188.
100
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.
101
Id.
102
Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect
What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1877 (2011).
103
See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600 (5th Cir. 2013).
104
Kerr, supra note 61, at 322.
105
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
106
Id. Because the device was installed after the deadline stated on the warrant, the use
of the GPS device on the vehicle was warrantless.
107
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
108
Id.
98
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search and seizure as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment.109
The ruling passed down in Jones states unanimously that the
installation of a GPS tracking device underneath Jones’ car qualified as a
search under the Fourth Amendment.110 It might be presumed the court came
to this conclusion through the application of the Katz test, however, this is
where the mosaic theory came into play.
The prosecution attempted to admit the GPS evidence the authorities
on the case collected to show that Jones was involved, however, Jones moved
to suppress it.111 The Court determined any evidence indicating the car was
in Jones’ garage had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
this was an area that it can be posited that Jones had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.112 However, the judge, citing United States v. Knotts, decided
that the same analysis applied to GPS monitoring.113 Both Maynard and
Jones were convicted and both appealed their convictions, however, only
Jones challenged the GPS evidence allowed at trial.114
Jones argued on appeal that Knotts should not be applicable because
comparing a GPS device to a beeper was an invalid comparison technologywise; GPS tracking is far more advanced.115 This is where the mosaic theory
argument came into play: the GPS device, when all the information it
collected was pieced together, collected so much data that it created an
exceptionally clear picture of the defendant’s life.116 This monitoring was so
intrusive it bore resemblance to an invasive search.117 This argument
convinced the Court to overturn Jones’ conviction on the grounds that the
use of the GPS device over twenty-eight days was a Fourth Amendment
search.118 In the court’s view, the monitoring of the GPS over time
constituted a search because while, indeed, the public could observe Jones’
individual movements, it was highly improbable the public would observe
109

Id.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64.
113
Id. at 555–56 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (explaining that a
person traveling on a public road has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore the
use of a beeper positioned in a suspect’s car by authorities to broadcast location was
permissible)).
114
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
115
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
116
Id. at 562; see People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (determining
that prolonged GPS monitoring yields a highly detailed profile beyond just location, but also
of our associations and patterns); see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003)
(en banc) (stating that GPS tracking devices record travels and can be used to paint a detailed
picture of one’s life).
117
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012).
118
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568.
110
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the complete set of his movements that the GPS device revealed.119 The
tracking painted an alarmingly clear picture of Jones’ life that he would not
expect others to have.120 Although there were concurring opinions in
Maynard and Jones, the opinions all agreed on one thing—that it was the
collective sum of government action, not individual sequential steps, which
are to be looked at when determining what counts as a Fourth Amendment
search.121
The Jones ruling may have reinforced Fourth Amendment rights as they
pertain to GPS, but with technology constantly evolving it is impossible to
say for how long the ruling will remain relevant.122 The third-party doctrine,
or the idea that when one consents to releasing data to at least one third party
(such as a cell phone provider) they have no reasonable expectation of their
data being private, plays an incredibly large role in this.123 Physical contact
no longer needs to be made in order to use GPS to track an individual; cell
phone based GPS as well as programs integrated into vehicles (such as the
Ford Sync or OnStar) make one’s GPS data property of a third-party, and as
such can be obtained by law enforcement.124
2. Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule which dictates
that an individual gives up all Fourth Amendment protections with regard to
the information disclosed to a third-party.125 Any assumption of purpose or
confidence in the third party on the part of the revealing individual is
irrelevant.126 Therefore, Katz does not apply, as an individual cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party.127
Critics of the doctrine make two arguments.128 The first criticism is that
the doctrine does not accurately apply the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test.129 Indeed, individuals generally expect privacy with respect to
third-party records such as phone records.130 Justice Marshall’s reasoning in
119

Id. at 558.
See id.
121
See Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
122
See generally Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
123
See Price, supra note 16, at 277.
124
See id. at 291–92.
125
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528–29 (2006).
126
Id. at 529.
127
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see also Joseph E. Schumacher &
Christopher Slobogin, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
129
Schumacher & Slobogin, supra note 128, at 732.
130
Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of
120
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his Smith v. Maryland dissent reflects the same.131 It is difficult to reason
that an individual “voluntarily” surrenders information to a third party such
as a telephone company—they have no choice in the matter.132 The second
argument critics of the doctrine make is that it grants government too much
power—it gives government the authority to take more intrusive steps
without constitutional oversight than is consistent with societal freedoms and
expectations.133 This argument contends the government is given the power
to, essentially, harass individuals.134 The major concern proponents of this
argument have is that because third-party services such as Internet Service
Providers and phone providers are so prevalent in today’s digital age, if these
services take a growing role in government surveillance, the Fourth
Amendment will regulate less digital surveillance.135 If the Fourth
Amendment is not protecting third-party service, the government can collect
more information that one might “reasonably” expect to be private from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.136
D. Securing Privacy Rights
In Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Riley v.
California, he argued:
We should not mechanically apply the rule used in the
predigital era to the search of a cell phone. Many cell
phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a
quantity of information, some highly personal, that no
person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy
form.
Justice Alito further suggested that Congress or state legislatures
consider new laws that draw rational divisions based on categories of
information, otherwise privacy protection in the twenty-first century will
suffer.137
The best body to deal with the issue of privacy concerns with respect to
electronic surveillance is the legislature; courts are reactive, but it is the
Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981).
131
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reasoning “it
is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have
no realistic alternative.”).
132
See Ashdown, supra note 130, at 1315.
133
White, 401 U.S. at 782 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134
Id. at 752.
135
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002).
136
Id.
137
Riley, 573 U.S. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring).
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legislature which has the affordance of being proactive.138 There lies little
rationale in applying the outdated precedent of Katz, given that so little is
private in the digital age. The void that the obsolete Katz left must be filled
legislatively to help deem what data can be considered private.139
1. Why the ECPA Holds the Key
Since its conception in 1986, the ECPA has been amended numerous
times.140 However, none of the amendments adequately protected the
electronic information of private citizens to the extent necessary in today’s
digital age.141 The ECPA has not yet been amended to adapt to the
technology of today to provide adequate Fourth Amendment protections.
The ECPA holds the key because unlike the Fourth Amendment, which
regulates only the government and private parties acting on the government’s
behalf, the ECPA recognizes that private parties acting on their own can pose
a serious danger to digital privacy.142
While Congress may not have considered the technology-driven society
we live in today when the ECPA was written, it is nonetheless the body that
should address society’s advances in technology.143 Several jurisdictions
have already considered the ECPA’s shortcomings in this respect; several
states have enacted legislation affording stronger protection to digital
information than the federal ECPA.144 This action by the states shows not
only that the legislature is capable of adequately enforcing these protections
but that, presently, the ECPA has failed to do so thus far. Although the
amendments made to the ECPA thus far have failed to adapt to the digital
age, they are nevertheless the perfect conduit for doing so.145
138
Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy
Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 67 (2014).
139
Id. at 68.
140
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 872 (explaining as an example that “. . . if America Online can look through the
e-mails of its 30 million subscribers and disclose the evidence to the police without restriction,
this would gut Internet privacy protections. The Fourth Amendment does not restrict this
disclosure, but ECPA does: in addition to restricting the ability of law enforcement to order
private ISPs [internet service providers] to disclose communications to law enforcement, the
law also restricts the ability of private ISPs to disclose communications to law enforcement
voluntarily.”).
143
See discussion supra Part III(D)(i). Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which regulates
only the government and private parties acting on the government’s behalf, the ECPA also
regulates private parties acting on their own.
144
Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct.
8, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/.
145
See, e.g., id.
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Courts have generally deferred to Congress on ECPA issues.146
However, because Congress has not reformed the ECPA to provide guidance
with respect to the technological boom, courts have inconsistently applied
the statute.147 Today’s technology requires a new analysis because of how
expansive and different technology is compared to when the ECPA was
enacted; modern technology is fraught with exponentially more data.148 The
courts’ inconsistent analyses show that the judiciary defers in whole to
Congress on digital privacy issues. Moreover, the previously examined
cases show that judges all the way up to the Supreme Court lack the ability
to aptly apply and understand technological differences. Judges are,
however, acutely aware of this issue.149 Additionally, the government has
expressed similar concerns and promoted a legislation-based solution to this
issue.150 Many factors and considerations are at play with such a complex
statutory change, and the courts do not have the expertise or time to do so.
The legislature is equipped to promote this change and probe the complex
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and technology.151 The courts
cannot, and should not, be left to decipher this statute which is inept to
provide suitable guidance. For courts to provide consistent decisions on
Fourth Amendment issues involving digital data, the legislature must act to
recognize modern technology’s implicit differences from the technologies
that existed at the time of the ECPA’s inception.
2. A Potential Mosaic Theory Framework Fix
The mosaic theory presents challenges to modern day Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence (the Katz test), however, the Katz test is
exceptionally outdated. For this reason, it makes sense that Katz should be
done away with regards to digital content and new legislation should take its
146

Achal Oza, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get
Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1054–55 (2008).
147
See Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored
Communications Act in a Civil Litigation Context, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 644 (2011).
148
See Peter Van Buren, 4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Won’t Protect You Anymore,
MOTHERJONES (Jun. 26, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/how-fourthamendment-not-protect/.
149
Riley, 573 U.S. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing a lack of confidence in
the Court being the best entity to decipher the relationship between today’s technology and
the Fourth Amendment) (stating that “I would reconsider the question presented here if either
Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation . . . .”).
150
Brief of Amicus Curiae Michael Varco in Support of Respondent, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-402), at 29 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 427–
28 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological
change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative” because a “legislative body
is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”)).
151
See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7.
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place. The mosaic theory may challenge the Katz test, but nevertheless, it is
a new, mosaic theory-esque legislation that should be enacted in place of
Katz.
The mosaic theory gives rise to several challenges. The first is the fact
that the mosaic theory is a highly subjective concept. Courts can choose
whether to apply it, and the premises for doing so are extraordinarily varied.
The mosaic theory is not a concrete legal concept, but rather a theory upon
which many courts have begun to rely.152 As such, the mosaic theory brings
with it many questions that the courts must address.
The first of these questions is that of a standard. This is necessary if
courts are to adopt the mosaic theory. This is important when observing
mosaic theory interpretations of the past; one need only look to the promosaic opinions of Maynard and Jones to see that the same case can be
interpreted many different ways.153
Although the three examples that will be mentioned analyze the
Maynard and Jones cases differently, they all agree on one thing: it is the
collective sum of government action, not the individual steps, which must be
analyzed to determine what counts as a Fourth Amendment search.154
As previously discussed, the D.C. Circuit’s viewpoint in Maynard
asked whether the government learned more than a stranger could have
observed.155 This opinion introduced the mosaic theory.156 The court viewed
government conduct as violating one’s reasonable expectation of privacy
depending on the likelihood that the evidence collected was exposed to the
public.157 However, this claim was one that blanketed the entirety of the GPS
monitoring—the whole twenty-eight days the respondent was surveilled—
not just the individual pieces.158 In the Circuit Court’s opinion, the
monitoring in the Maynard and Jones amounted to a search because it was
highly unlikely that the public would observe the entirety of the respondent’s
actions.159 The public could, indeed, have witnessed individual parts of
Jones’ movements, but it was essentially improbable for an individual to
observe the entirety.160 The court wrote that the collective sum of the twentyeight days of surveillance revealed more than the sum of its parts; the non152
David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 631 (2005).
153
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 400–13.
154
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
155
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
156
Id. at 562.
157
Id. at 558–59.
158
Id. at 560–61.
159
Id.; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
160
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560–61.
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searches taken in aggregate became a search because while the individual
pieces seem meaningless in isolation, when assembled together they painted
a mosaic revealing a clear picture of one’s life.161
Justice Alito’s interpretation in the Jones case looked at societal
expectations with regard to the practices of law enforcement.162 From his
point of view, a search occurs when investigators amass and analyze
evidence in a fashion which would concern members of society.163 In his
concurrence, Justice Alito analyzed the case by asking whether the
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by long term
monitoring of his vehicle.164 Alito then went on to make the claim that this
monitoring encroaches on expectations of privacy.165 This type of
monitoring would concern members of society because it is expected that
law enforcement agents would not, but also that they could not, secretly
monitor and index every movement of one’s car for such a long period of
time.166
Conversely, Justice Sotomayor looked at government power in her
Jones concurrence.167 If the government can learn details about an
individual’s personal life more or less at will, a search has occurred.168 In
her concurrence, she argued that when assessing objective reasonableness
per Katz, it is pertinent the monitoring paint a detailed, comprehensive record
of one’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about a person’s
family, political views, profession, religion, and other associations.169
Justice Sotomayor took the stance that even the most seemingly innocuous
data might be relevant to constitutional protection.170
Another question pertaining to the mosaic theory that needs to be
addressed is when the mosaic begins. In traditional Fourth Amendment
application, generally only the question of how the information is acquired
is of particular interest. However, now that the mosaic theory has entered
the arena, the question becomes where the mosaic begins in terms of
surveillance.171 As the mosaic theory articulates that it is the taking together
of data to create a clear picture of an individual, it evidently extends beyond
the acquisition of information stage, which is typically where traditional
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 415-16.
See id.
See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 59, at 768.
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Fourth Amendment application stops.172 Aggregating the data that builds the
mosaic requires taking it a step further—analyzing the data.
Moreover, the question of how much data is enough to make a viable
mosaic must be answered. The GPS device in United States v. Jones was
installed for twenty-eight days, which was deemed by Justice Alito as
“definitely” being long enough; however, he presented no reasoning as to
why this was the case.173 Where is the line drawn? Was it drawn at two
days—or at twenty-eight? This is a critical question.174
The general focus when it comes to the mosaic theory has been GPS
surveillance, however, mosaics can be pieced together with other sorts of
data as well. Taking one’s web searches/sites visited, telephone numbers
called, and emails in aggregate paints a clear picture of one’s life even
without location monitoring. Does the mosaic theory apply here as well?
Add location data, and an even clearer profile of the surveilled individual
can be put together. While the mosaic theory may present challenges to the
Katz test used to analyze Fourth Amendment claims, the philosophy
underlying it is precisely what would make for a revitalized approach to these
claims in the digital age.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have presented few, if any, alternatives to Katz; however, it
is evident that there is work that needs to be done in securing privacy rights
in the digital age. While today’s technology has innumerable benefits, it can
also be used to gather information about individuals that would otherwise
require a warrant. Cell phones are an omnipresent aspect of the modern age
and with their capabilities, they are able to paint a startlingly clear picture of
one’s life. Adding to this is the third-party doctrine, which essentially
declares that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information that
has been voluntarily turned over to third parties.175 This would include
information obtained by an individual’s cell phone provider.176 Public
actions, such as traveling in a car, are likewise not afforded a reasonable
expectation of privacy.177 By this logic, then, there is not much in this digital
age entitled to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as posited by Katz.178
172

See, e.g., id.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
174
See Kerr, supra note 61, at 333–34. Kerr’s article analyzes the length of time needed
to create a viable mosaic and demonstrates that this is a critical, yet extremely complicated
question. Courts must make fact-specific determinations of how much data is enough to make
a viable mosaic.
175
See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
176
Id. at 742–43.
177
See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
178
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362.
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This suggests that the capabilities of today’s technologies should be shaping
the average individual’s perception of their privacy; the problem with this is
that, barring the “tech-savvy,” many individuals are unaware of the intricate
capabilities of their devices or, perhaps more importantly, the doctrine that
underlies it. This presents a challenge to the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution.
The technological developments of today have placed a tremendous
amount of stress on the frameworks for Fourth Amendment privacy
protections. These frameworks developed in an era when electronics did not
exist or otherwise were not prevalent, and the Supreme Court has been
unsuccessful in keeping up with the application of the Fourth Amendment
with today’s technology. For courts to provide consistent decisions on
Fourth Amendment issues involving digital data, the legislature must act to
recognize modern technology’s implicit differences from the technologies
that existed at the time of the ECPA’s inception.

